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INTRODUCTION
For each economic or social success case in Brazil, there is a public re‑
search institute and/or a university in a supporting role. This relationship that 
lies behind most Brazilian products with comparative advantages in the inter‑
national market was built during a long historical process of learning and ac‑
cumulation of scientific knowledge and technological competencies. This pro‑
cess involved significant linkages between productive effort, government’s 
policy and funding, and research and education institutions. The most notori‑
ous examples are: in health sciences, the production of serums and vaccines by 
Oswaldo Cruz Institute and Butantan Institute; in agrarian sciences, produc‑
tion and exports of soybean and other grains, cotton, cellulose and meats by 
firms and planters interacting with Campinas Institute of Agronomy (IAC), 
Federal University of Viçosa (UFV), Embrapa (Brazilian Agricultural Research 
Corporation), and several regional education and research institutes; in min‑
ing, materials engineering and metallurgy, production of ores and develop‑
ment of steels and special metal alloys by mining and steel corporations in 
collaboration with Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG); in aeronauti‑
cal engineering, aircraft production by Embraer (Brazilian Aeronautics Corpo‑
ration) supported by a specialized research institute — the Aeronautics Tech‑
nical Center (CTA) and a specialized higher education institution — the 
Aeronautics Technology Institute (ITA); in geosciences, oil and gas production 
by Petrobras (Brazilian Oil Corporation), specially the drilling technologies 
for deep waters developed in interaction with Federal University of Rio de Ja‑
neiro (UFRJ), State University of Campinas (Unicamp) and many other educa‑
tion and research institutions all over the country.
Although incomplete, the institutions of an evolving system of innovation 
are important, in the Brazilian case, to support areas, sectors and products 
where Brazil has competences or international competitive advantages. In oth‑
er words, in these successful areas, sectors and products the interactions are 
operating between, on the one hand, universities and public research insti‑
tutes, and on the other hand, firms, farmers and society at large. 
This paper falls under the heading of economic history of science and tech‑
nology, as suggested by Tamás Szmrecsányi (2000), because history matters for 
maturing mutually reinforcing relationships between those two dimensions. 
Furthermore, economic history of science and technology indicates that the 
monetary‑financial dimension should be integrated into the analysis. As this 
paper shows, the formation and the maturing of successful cases of interaction 
take time and result from long‑term processes of institutional building. History 
also matters in a broader sense related to the major features of Brazilian system 
of innovation, because there is a late onset of this institutional process — the 
early 19th Century. This late beginning precedes Brazilian late industrialization 
but has important relationships with the nature of our industrialization. That 
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is why a study of economic history of science and technology helps the under‑
standing of present day structure of Brazilian system of innovation.
Therefore, the subject of this paper is the historical roots of interactions 
between public research institutes, universities and firms, a key feature of a 
national innovation system formation. The objective of this paper is to inves‑
tigate the contributions of public research institutes (PRIs) and universities, in 
their interactions with firms and economic agents at large, to the successful 
cases of Brazilian economy. Conventional wisdom seems to underestimate the 
role of universities and PRIs in less developed countries. This conjecture may 
shed new light in the interpretation of Brazilian national system of innovation 
(NSI): since universities and PRIs are so important for those successful cases, 
their late onset may be an important handicap for the evolution of Brazilian 
NSI. Furthermore, the problematic social context of this late onset (slavery, 
poverty) may further handicap the country’s institutional development.
This paper is organized in six sections. The first section presents argu‑
ments from the field of economic history of science and technology, putting 
forward a broad agenda to inform our investigation of the historical roots of 
Brazilian NSI. The second section focuses the specific feature of NSI that is the 
subject of our investigation, reviewing the literature on interactions between 
firms and universities in developed nations. The third section introduces the 
discussion of the Brazilian institutions, presenting the late onset of NSI institu‑
tions, a first wave of institutional building (the second decade of 19th Century). 
The fourth section describes the other four waves of institutional formation in 
Brazil. The fifth section focuses on the history of three selected successful cas‑
es, which spans from a low‑tech sector (agriculture), a medium‑tech sector 
(steel and special metal alloys) to a high‑tech sector (aircraft). Sixth section 
concludes the paper, summing up the main findings and discussing how the 
unveiled pattern of long‑term maturation of successful points of interaction 
may confront current challenges.
THREE DIMENSIONS FOR AN ECONOMIC  
HISTORy OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGy
To develop the idea proposed by Szmrecsányi (2000), it may be necessary 
to deal with three dimensions, not just science and technology, but also their 
sources of funding, which entails some kind of analysis of monetary and finan‑
cial structures. Although this subject merits a theoretical and historical discus‑
sion too vast to come within the scope of this article, a few exploratory com‑
ments may contribute here to a deeper understanding of the conjectures 
mentioned in the introduction: as discussed in the thrird section below, the 
lagging process of university and research institution building, alongside the 
lateness of Brazilian industrialization, also combine with the backwardness 
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arising from the relatively recent creation of monetary and financial institu‑
tions in Brazil. 
One of the most striking elements in world history is the coincidence, cor‑
relation or geographical juxtaposition between scientific and technological 
leadership and the leading region’s position in terms of accumulated monetary 
and financial resources. However, care is of course required to avoid mecha‑
nistic associations and develop appropriate mediations and qualifications. 
On an initial level, the vast historical panel elaborated by Braudel (1979; 
1986) provides a secure introduction to this articulation. Braudel argues for 
the existence of multiple “world‑economies”, each with its own hierarchy and 
center. In the third volume of Civilization and Capitalism (entitled “The Per‑
spective of the World”), Braudel traces the development of the European 
world‑economy and the “world‑cities” that successively ruled it: Venice 
(1378‑1498), Genoa (1557‑1627), Amsterdam (1585‑1773), and London 
(1773‑). Albeit outside the scope of his book (which stops at 1800), on many 
occasions he suggests how the sequence continues, with New york taking 
London’s place in the 1920s. 
The relations between these three dimensions can be inferred from a topic 
in the exposition of G. Arrighi, who identifies an analogy between the Italian 
and Dutch patterns, in the shape of “surplus capital utilization for investment 
in the conspicuous consumption of cultural products through the patronage of 
the arts and other intellectual pursuits”. According to Arrighi (1994, p. 139), 
“just as fifteenth‑century Venice and Florence had been the centers of the High 
Renaissance, so early seventeenth‑century Amsterdam became the center of 
the transition from the ‘climate of the Renaissance’, which had pervaded Eu‑
rope in the preceding two centuries, to the ‘climate of the Enlightenment’, 
which was to pervade Europe in the next century and a half”. 
On a second level of analysis, it is possible to identify in the work of a 
historian of technology with the quality of J. Mokyr fairly early signs of link‑
ages between universities and important economic activities. During the Re‑
naissance, a period of history during which economic and financial hegemony 
was located in the Italian city‑states, Mokyr highlights as one of the achieve‑
ments of science and technology the onset of the application of mathematics to 
engineering. Among other applications, notes Mokyr (1990, p. 74), “[i]n the 
fifteenth century, Italian mathematicians showed how navigation could be 
aided by mathematics and Venice created a university chair of mathematics 
devoted to navigation”. 
Along the same lines, Freeman (1999, pp. 150‑151), in an interesting his‑
torical overview of innovation systems, refers to the industrial and technologi‑
cal leadership of Venice (stressing its leadership in finance) and notes that im‑
portant institutions were created in the Italian city‑states, including the first 
universities and the first system of patents (Venice, in 1474).
On a third level of analysis, it is possible to identify this three‑dimensional 
articulation by focusing on a key individual in the scientific revolution. Galileo 
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was supported among others by the Medici, the leading bankers during that 
period. Galileo produced horoscopes for the Medici (Reale et al., 1986, vol. II, 
p. 199).1 He studied and researched in Padua, Venice and Florence. His skill in 
instrumentation enabled him to develop a powerful telescope; indeed, he sup‑
plemented his salary as professor of mathematics at the University of Padua by 
making and repairing scientific instruments (Mokyr, 1990, p. 73). Moreover, 
the technical means to produce special lenses were available in the city where 
he lived, then an important glass manufacturing center (Ravetz, 1990, p. 210). 
In an account of the improvements introduced into mining during and after 
the Renaissance, Mokyr locates demands presented by this sector to the scien‑
tists of the time: “[t]he greatest minds of the seventeenth century, from Galileo 
to Newton, were concerned with problems of air circulation, safety, pumping, 
mineralogy and assaying, and the raising of coal and ore from the mines” 
(1990, p. 64).
On a fourth level of analysis, a more recent case suggests that it is possible 
to identify a link between the characteristics of finance (public and private) in 
the United States and the evolution of its industrial and scientific structure.
In formulating his concept of the “Long Wave from 1787 to 1842”, 
Schumpeter (1939) discussed the role played by the creation of credit and 
other contributions peculiar to the industrialization process then under way: 
“[i]n the United States profits and the ad hoc creation of means of payment 
were obviously the main domestic sources of the ‘funds’ which financed indus‑
trial and other enterprises” (p. 195).2 He then suggested a role for the daring 
banking practices of the period: “[i]t was the financing of innovation by credit 
creation — the only method available, as we have seen in the course of our 
theoretical argument, in the absence of sufficient results of previous evolution 
— which is at the bottom of that ‘reckless banking’. This undoubtedly sheds a 
different light upon it. Those banks filled their function sometimes dishonestly 
and even criminally, but they filled a function which can be distinguished from 
their dishonesty or criminality” (p. 197).
As for public finance, a number of changes made to the U.S. financial sys‑
tem during the New Deal (when the U.S. was consolidating its world eco‑
nomic and financial leadership) can be considered a precondition for the archi‑
tecture of the innovation system built during and after World War II. The 
strengthening of public finance through the fiscal and tax‑raising hegemony of 
the central government certainly created one of the foundations for the signifi‑
cant federal public spending on R&D that was to distinguish the U.S. in the 
1950s and 1960s, especially for basic science (Nelson & Wright, 1992).
In sum, addressing all three dimensions (money‑finance, science, and tech‑
1 When Galileo discovered Jupiter’s moons, he originally named them Cosmica Sydera in honor of 
Cosimo de’ Medici. He later opted for Medicea Sydera, honoring all four Medici brothers.
2 For a discussion of monetary innovation in the United States, see Sylla (1982).
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nology) is most important in the economic history of science and technology. 
Once again, it is necessary to allude to Braudel, who explores the relations 
between money and technique (1986, p. 81) and emphatically notes the role of 
finance in the English industrial revolution.
HISTORICAL ROOTS OF UNIVERSITy‑FIRMS  
INTERACTION IN DEVELOPED INNOVATION SySTEMS
The notion of national systems of innovation derives from the evolution‑
ist or neo‑Schumpeterian approach: it expresses the complex institutional ar‑
rangement that drives technological progress and by so doing determines the 
wealth of nations (Freeman, 1995). The NSI concept was developed by schol‑
ars who consider history an important element (Freeman, Nelson and Rosen‑
berg, among others). Freeman (1995), for example, locates and discusses the 
emergence and historical development of specialized research and develop‑
ment (R&D) activities, an institutional innovation introduced into Germany 
in 1870: this argument presented by Freeman can be considered a suggestion 
for a research agenda in which history is decisive.
The development of an economic history of science and technology, there‑
fore, would contribute a great deal to our understanding of the historical roots 
of innovation systems. This theoretical dialogue is one of the motivations for 
the present article. 
To some extent all the most important research into innovation systems 
takes into account the historical roots of the process of building the relevant 
institutions. The collection of essays edited by Richard Nelson (1993) is an 
excellent example. All 16 studies of experiences in different countries include 
detailed descriptions and analysis of the origins and historical development of 
the institutions that make up the various innovation systems concerned. These 
case studies, particularly those on the U.S., Japan, Germany, Sweden and Den‑
mark, provide a wealth of examples of persistent traditions, path dependence 
and evolutionary processes grounded in historically relevant efforts. As a re‑
sult it is not hard to see the relevance of assessing the history of how the insti‑
tutions that make up these systems, especially research institutions, universi‑
ties and firms, have been built.
Unfortunately one of the main weaknesses of the evolutionist approach is 
precisely its failure to examine in depth how monetary and financial systems 
are linked with the construction of innovation systems. In a critical review of 
the literature, O’Sullivan (2004) highlights this significant lacuna in innova‑
tion economics and proposes a dialogue between researchers in this field and 
financial historians to fill the gap. 
Aware of this important limitation, we can move on and ask what the 
literature has to say about the interactions between science and technology in 
well‑developed national systems of innovation (NSIs). 
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Nelson & Rosenberg (1993, pp. 5‑9) point to the intertwining of science 
and technology as a key feature of NSIs. They sum up the complex interac‑
tions between these two dimensions by saying that science is both a “leader 
and follower” of technological progress. Evidence of this dual role can be 
drawn from the literature.
Rosenberg (1982) presents the role of technology as: (1) a source of ques‑
tions and problems for scientific endeavors; (2) an “enormous repository of 
empirical knowledge to be scrutinized and evaluated by scientists” (p. 144); 
(3) a contribution to formulation of the “subsequent agenda for science” (p. 
147); and (4) a source of instruments and research equipment etc. Rosenberg 
concludes that “powerful economic impulses are shaping, directing and con‑
straining the scientific enterprise” (p. 159).
Looking now at the flow in the opposite direction, Klevorick et al. (1995) 
present empirical evidence about the role of universities and science as an im‑
portant source of “technological opportunities” for industrial innovation. 
Their study shows how different industrial sectors rank the relative impor‑
tance of universities and science to their innovative capabilities.3 
Rosenberg (1991) asks “why firms do basic research” and suggests it is an 
“entry ticket to a network of information”. This point relates to the discussion 
in Cohen & Levinthal (1989) about the two sides of R&D, innovation and 
learning, stressing the importance of investment as a way to develop “absorp‑
tive capability”.
Narin et al. (1997) find empirical evidence for the “increasing linkage” 
between science financed by the public sector and industry in the U.S. A recent 
OECD study describes the “intensification of science‑industry relations in the 
knowledge economy”, stressing that “links with science are more important 
than in the past” (OECD, 2002, p. 16).
Finally, Rosenberg (2000) suggests U.S. universities differ from those of 
other (developed) countries “in the greater speed and greater extent of their 
response to changing economic circumstances” (p. 36). He notes five distinc‑
tive features of U.S. universities: (1) the ability to respond to the economic 
needs of society (“economic responsiveness”); (2) a high degree of decentral‑
ization; (3) close connectedness between universities as well as intense compe‑
tition (for resources, especially financial support); (4) the size of the university 
system (“its great size, in contrast to any of the European countries, is impor‑
tant because it has made it possible to maintain a high degree of specialization 
and diversity within a large system”, p. 41); and (5) a unique synthesis of ad‑
vanced research with graduate and professional education (p. 42). Rosenberg’s 
analysis helps show the importance of the size of a university system in en‑
3 Klevorick et al. show why firms monitor and follow developments in the universities. Significant 
knowledge streams flow from scientific institutions to the industrial sector, particularly high‑tech in‑
dustries.
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abling it to respond quickly to economic requirements, as may perhaps be 
more clearly presented in Klevorick et al. (1995), Narin et al. (1997) and Co‑
hen et al. (2002).
These studies underscore the relevance of these two dimensions of innova‑
tive activities, stressing the division of labor between them, supporting an un‑
derstanding of the strong and mutual feedback between science and technol‑
ogy in developed countries, and indicating an intensification of these linkages. 
Thus the literature suggests that these relationships need to function for mod‑
ern economic growth to be feasible. 
These studies focus strongly on the case of the United States. It is not dif‑
ficult to show how the institutions and dynamics of interaction have been built 
up, as discussed in the above‑mentioned texts. Work by such researchers as 
Rosenberg (1972; 2000), Nelson & Wright (1992) and Nelson & Rosenberg 
(1994) describes important aspects for an understanding of this long construc‑
tion process.
The argument of this paper can now be formulated more specifically: A 
long historical process is required to build these linkages and interactions. At 
least five elements (which depend on investment and time for development 
and maturation) can be indicated: (1) preparation of the monetary and finan‑
cial arrangements to make feasible the creation and functioning of universi‑
ties/research institutions and firms, among other elements; (2) construction of 
the relevant institutions (universities, research institutions, firms, and their 
R&D laboratories); (3) construction of mechanisms to enable these two di‑
mensions to interact (research problems, challenges etc. that induce at least 
one of the two sides to seek out the other and attempt to establish a dialogue); 
(4) development of interactions between the two dimensions (learning pro‑
cesses, trial and error etc); and (5) consolidation and development of these 
interactions, involving an explicit recognition of the role played by time to 
build mutually reinforcing relationships (positive feedback) between research 
institutions/universities and firms (as could be derived from the literature re‑
viewed above). 
THE LATE ONSET OF INSTITUTION BUILDING IN BRAzIL4 
A preliminary comparison between Brazil and the United States at the 
time of independence is enlightening: in 1822, with a population of 4.7 mil‑
lion, Brazil had no universities (Cunha, 1980), while in 1776, with 2.5 million 
4 This and the next sections aim at presenting a historical overview of the country’s institution building 
in higher education and science and technology, highlighting major trends, institutions and knowledge 
areas. No attempt was made to cover all higher education and research institutions either at national 
or regional levels.
Revista de Economia Política  31 (1), 2011 11
inhabitants, the U.S. had nine universities (Maddison, 2001).5 Even in com‑
parison with other Latin American countries, Brazil made a very late start on 
setting up universities. According to Schwartzman (1979, p. 54), “in institu‑
tional terms science in Brazil lagged far behind science in Spanish America 
until the second half of the eighteenth century [...] Fearing the establishment in 
Brazil of institutions that could rival those of Portugal, the Crown prevented 
the creation of a university [...]”.
Although several medical, law and other schools of higher education were 
founded after 1808, when the Portuguese Court moved to Rio de Janeiro, no 
attempts to set up universities were made until the 1920s and, according to the 
literature on the formation of the Brazilian scientific community, the first 
full‑fledged university created in Brazil was the University of São Paulo (USP), 
founded in 1934 (Schwartzman, 1979), by which time the population had 
passed the 30 million mark. The universities founded in the 1920s were named 
by Cunha (1980) as “transient universities”, as for example the University of 
Minas Gerais and the University of Rio de Janeiro.6 Cunha’s book is appropri‑
ately entitled Universidade Temporã (“The Latecomer University”). 
These latecomer universities, however, resulted from a process of institu‑
tion‑building that had begun a long time ago. For example, when USP was 
founded it incorporated the Polytechnic (founded 1894), the School of Phar‑
macy (1898), the School of Medicine & Surgery (1912), the Institute of Vet‑
erinary Medicine (1919), and the Biological Institute (1924), among others.
At the turn of the century there were “only six institutions in connection 
with which one could speak of a scientific spirit and a taste for experimenta‑
tion, and only one of those could be considered directly part of the university 
sphere”.7 One of the characteristics of the science “that was institutionalized” 
in early twentieth‑century Brazil was its location “outside the higher education 
system” (Schwartzman, 1979, p. 136).
If the creation of universities in Brazil began at the earliest in the 1920s, 
when did scientific research begin, given that it was conducted “outside the 
higher education system”? Until the late nineteenth century there were some 
scientific research activities in mineralogy, chemistry, natural sciences, agrono‑
5 To emphasize the importance of universities to development processes, it is worth comparing Ger‑
many in the 1870s, with 16 universities, and England, with only five (Blackbourn, 2003, p. 207). The 
history of the late nineteenth century shows Germany overtaking England in industrial, technological 
and scientific terms.
6 According to Schwartzman (1979, p. 418), while the creation of the University of Rio de Janeiro in 
1920 merged the Medical School, Polytechnic and Law School, “it changed practically nothing in the 
way the schools functioned”. 
7 (Schwartzman, 1979, p. 139). The institutions in question were: the Paraense Museum, the Campinas 
Institute of Agronomy (IAC), the Paulista Museum, the Botanical Gardens of Rio de Janeiro, the Man‑
guinhos (Oswaldo Cruz) Institute, and the Bahia Medical School.
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my, and zoology, as well as studies of bacteriological and microbiological 
problems, but they were limited in nature and sparsely distributed in institu‑
tions such as museums8 and research institutions.9 However, a major step in 
Brazilian scientific history, specifically in health sciences, was the creation of 
the Manguinhos Institute (later Oswaldo Cruz Institute) in 1900, with Dr. 
Oswaldo Cruz as its key personage. Cruz was a graduate of the Rio de Janeiro 
Medical School and studied at the Pasteur Institute in Paris from 1896 to 1899 
(Stepan, 1976, pp. 69‑73). 
The school from which Cruz won his degree in medicine was founded in 
1808, after King João VI came to Brazil. The arrival of the Portuguese Court 
led to significant changes including the creation of institutions such as anato‑
my and surgery courses in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, the Botanical Gardens 
(1808), and the Military Academy (1810), which implicitly taught engineering 
(Cunha, 1980; Schwartzman, 1979). According to Cunha (1980, p. 69), “re‑
structuring and expansion of higher education in Brazil after 1808 moved the 
study of mathematics, physics, biology and mineralogy out of philosophy 
courses, controlled by the Church, and into medical courses and the Military 
Academy, and much later to the Polytechnic when it split off from the latter”. 
The creation of these institutions between 1808 and 1810 can be consid‑
ered the beginning of systematic efforts to create research and education insti‑
tutions in Brazil. It is worth stressing the long gap in time between the creation 
of these institutions and that of the first universities: more than a century 
elapsed between one and the other. This explains the phrase coined by 
Schwartzman (1979, p. 81), who says science and higher education “vegetat‑
ed” in the nineteenth century in Brazil. Thus, the onset of the creation of sci‑
ence and technology institutions was not only late but also limited, since sci‑
ence and higher education merely vegetated during the nineteenth century, not 
to mention the fact that they were entirely separate from the rest of the na‑
tion’s cultural and social life, although as discussed in the next section there 
was to be a second wave before the century was out. 
This late onset was closely related to economic stagnation and to Brazil’s 
colonial status until 1808,10 with the (perhaps consequent) absence of mone‑
8 Particularly the Imperial Museum (1818), later renamed the National Museum, the Paraense Muse‑
um (founded in 1866 as Archeological & Ethnographic Museum of the Philomathic Society of Pará, 
later renamed the Goeldi Museum), and the Paulista Museum (1893).
9 Such as the Campinas Institute of Agronomy (IAC, 1887), the São Paulo Vaccinogenic Institute 
(1892), the São Paulo Bacteriological Institute (1893), and the Butantan Serum Therapy Institute 
(1899). See Schwartzman (1979: Appendix 1 — Timeline of Brazilian Science, 1500‑1945, by Tjerk 
Guus Franken); and Sanjad (2006) specifically on the Goeldi Museum.
10 The colonial period to 1808 can be considered a long epoch during which Brazil’s autonomous de‑
velopment remained blocked. The colonial system was a lasting obstacle to scientific accumulation for 
the future nation. Paula (1988) and Novais (1979) show how the mechanisms of colonial domination 
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tary institutions. According to Peláez & Suzigan (1976, p. 38), until the ar‑
rival of João VI monetary institutions “did not exist in Brazil, and there was 
nothing that could be called a paper currency”. Gold, silver and copper had 
hitherto comprised the only means of payment circulating in Brazil.
The situation in 1808 can be characterized as a combination of restric‑
tions imposed by the metropolis on manufacturing in the colony, a lack of 
higher education institutions, and a lack of monetary institutions. In other 
words, until 1808 the triad discussed in the first section (money, science and 
technology) was practically non‑existent in Brazil. After the arrival of João VI, 
institutions relating to the triad were created (Banco do Brasil, higher educa‑
tion institutions) or permitted (repeal of the ban on manufacturing).
Finally, besides being late and limited, the onset of institution building 
took place under adverse conditions, given the presence of slavery. Freyre 
(1990) discusses the relations between “slaves, animals and machines” in his 
book on Brazil during the sojourn of João VI (Chapter 10), describing how 
slavery contributed to the persistence of human traction in Brazil at a time 
when Western Europe and the U.S. were embarking on the transition from 
draft animals to steam traction (p. 527). Slavery was a major barrier to techni‑
cal progress: “there is one great cause that prevents the adoption of machinery 
in abridging manual labour, as so many persons have an interest in its being 
performed by the slaves alone”, noted an English observer cited by Freyre 
(1990, p. 533). 
Moreover, the inequality of the colonial economy determined by slavery is 
a key historical reason for the polarity between “modernization and marginal‑
ization”, defined by Celso Furtado (1987) as a structural feature of Brazilian 
economic growth and underdevelopment in general. This polarity and the “in‑
adequacy of technology” also identified by Furtado help explain the structural 
persistence of inequality in Brazil and suggest questions for evaluating their 
impact on science and technology (restriction of resources for and interest in 
the generalization of basic education and elimination of illiteracy, as well as 
preservation of the elitist nature of higher education, with significant conse‑
quences in terms of lack of critical mass to trigger positive feedback processes 
between science and technology). 
Furtado’s emphasis on social problems can also be seen in his argument 
that the success of South Korea and Taiwan owes much to social homogeniza‑
tion. In the Brazilian case, the modernization‑marginalization polarity imposed 
a dynamics of growth that systematically reproduced exclusion, thus preserv‑
ing and at times even intensifying social inequality.
In short, the discussion in this section shows that research and education 
operated to block economic progress in general. Within this overall blockage, specific measures af‑
fected the accumulation of scientific knowledge in Brazil. To take only one emblematic example, books 
were not allowed freely into the colony until 1821.
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institution building in Brazil began late, was limited in scope and problemati‑
cal in nature because of the adverse conditions under which it took place.
DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION  
AND RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS 
In addition to determining the late onset of the scientific accumulation 
process, the legacy of the colonial period includes countless problems that 
were to become major deficiencies and obstacles to development. The conse‑
quences of slavery have been analyzed by Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (1991, 
p. 25), Alfredo Bosi (1993, p. 146) and Roberto Schwarz (1991, p. 15). Ho‑
landa (pp. 50‑51) shows how “intelligence [was cultivated] as an ornament” 
rather than as an “instrument of knowledge and action”. Schwarz refers to the 
“misappropriation of modern ideas” in the initial period after Independence, 
blaming the local elite for “oligarchic appropriation of progress on the plane 
of ideas” (1991, p. 139). The long‑term influence of these problems on the 
process of scientific knowledge accumulation should not be underestimated, 
since they prevented the emergence of a climate that would have stimulated 
creativity, a free exchange of views, critical thinking, and experimentation, all 
of which are indispensable to scientific development. 
These problems help to explain the fact that, after the outburst in the cre‑
ation of institutions upon the arrival of the Portuguese Court to Rio de Janei‑
ro, only in the late Empire, between 1870 and 1900, did a second wave of in‑
stitution building occur. Most of the institutions then created were research 
institutions dedicated to natural history, astronomy, bacteriological medicine, 
descriptive geosciences and traditional chemistry (Schwartzman, 1979, pp. 
136‑7).11 However, three important higher education institutions, which later 
would have a notable influence on the accumulation of scientific knowledge 
applied to mining, materials and metallurgical engineering, and agronomy 
were founded in this period: the Ouro Preto Mining School (EMOP, 1875), 
the São Paulo Polytechnic (1894), and the Luiz de Queiroz Higher School of 
Agriculture (ESALQ, 1901).12
11 Some of the most notables among such research institutions then created are: the Pará Archeological 
& Ethnographic Museum (1866), the Geology Commission (1875, dissolved in 1877 for lack of funds), 
the Experimental Physiology Laboratory, attached to the Imperial Museum (1880), the São Paulo State 
Geography & Geology Commission (1886), IAC (1887), the Paulista Museum (1893), the Vaccino‑
genic, Bacteriological and Butantan Institutes (1892‑99), the Manguinhos (Oswaldo Cruz) Institute 
(1900), and the São Paulo Polytechnic’s Materials Testing Laboratory (1899), a precursor of the São 
Paulo State Technological Research Institute (IPT), officially founded in 1934. See Stepan (1976), 
Schwartzman (1979), and Motoyama (2004).
12 The Polytechnic school would become part of USP in 1934, as mentioned above. EMOP and ESALQ 
will be discussed in some detail in the next section. 
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A third wave can be identified in the period 1920‑34, when initiatives to 
create universities culminated with the foundation of USP in 1934. This was 
the “latecomer university” wave. The period is described by Cunha (1980), 
who distinguishes between “successful universities” and “transient universi‑
ties”. According to Cunha, “the first long‑lasting higher education institution 
in Brazil with the term university in its name was the University of Rio de Ja‑
neiro, founded in 1920 after many failed attempts” (p. 212). Its creation in‑
volved a merger of Rio de Janeiro’s Polytechnic with its Medical School and 
“one of its law schools” (p. 212). However, as mentioned above, the schools 
concerned continued to function independently (Schwartzman, 1979, p. 418). 
In 1927, the “technique of organizing universities by agglutination was emu‑
lated in Minas Gerais” (Cunha, 1980, p. 213). 
The creation of USP in 1934 amalgamated existing schools with the new‑
ly founded School of Philosophy, Sciences & Letters. USP’s foundation can be 
identified as the most important point in a broad process of endeavors, initia‑
tives and articulations to build universities in Brazil, and as the creation of a 
new standard of quality which became a national benchmark from then on 
(Motoyama, 2004; Schwartzman, 1979). The education‑research nexus was 
still weak, although there was already an awareness in some universities that a 
link had to be established.13
The fourth wave of institution building occurred in the post‑war period. 
A national association of researchers was founded in 1948 (SBPC — Brazilian 
Association for the Progress of Science). The Brazilian Center for Physics Re‑
search (CBPF) was set up in 1949 and the Aeronautics Technology Institute 
(ITA) in 1950, with the Aeronautics Technological Center (CTA) following 
shortly afterward. Two important Federal government coordinating institu‑
tions were set up in 1951: the National Research Council (CNPq) and the 
Higher Education Staff Development Office (CAPES). In the context of the 
period preceding the 1964 military coup, it is also important to note the cre‑
ation of the São Paulo State Research Funding Agency (Fapesp), and the Uni‑
versity of Brasília (UnB).
A fifth wave during the period of military rule can be identified. The high‑
lights were: (1) in higher education, the creation of state universities in São 
Paulo14 and in other states, as well as the beginning of graduate courses, creat‑
ing links between teaching and research activities; (2) the creation of research 
13 As noted by Schwartzman (1979, p. 104), in the 1930s ESALQ attempted to build closer ties be‑
tween teaching and research, especially in genetics, in collaboration with IAC, which had begun a 
program of genetics applied to agriculture in 1928 (Schwartzman, 1979, p. 274).
14 State University of Campinas (Unicamp, 1966), and State University of São Paulo (Unesp, 1976).
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centers in state‑owned enterprises like Petrobras and Telebras,15 and the foun‑
dation of Embrapa in 1973;16 (3) the establishment of regulating agencies for 
intellectual property,17 industrial sectors (computers, steel, oil) and regional 
development,18 and (4) the creation of institutions and funds for science and 
technology (S&T) financing, planning and policy making. In technology fi‑
nancing, the Technology Development Fund (Funtec) was set up in 1964 and 
administered by BNDES, the national development bank, which had been cre‑
ated in 1952. This fund gave birth to the National Technological Development 
& Innovation Agency (FINEP, 1965), which was to play an important role in 
coordinating government funding for S&T19 and implementing university 
courses for graduates. S&T Development Plans (PBDCT) were launched in the 
context of national development plans between 1972 and 1984, in an explicit 
attempt to create a truly national system for the development of science and 
technology (SNDCT). However, all these plans were only partially implement‑
ed and then abandoned in the 1980s with the advent of an acute macroeco‑
nomic crisis. 
A noteworthy fact about coordinating institutions is that Brazil’s Ministry 
of Science & Technology (MCT) was not created until 1985, with the end of 
the military regime. Until the mid‑1990s the MCT faced serious difficulties, as 
indeed did all the institutions responsible for S&T funding and development, 
because of the weakness of the monetary and financial system, the third ele‑
ment in the triad mentioned in the first section above. 
Although the monetary system grew as economic development gathered 
pace from the closing decades of the nineteenth century onwards, culminating 
in the creation of the Central Bank of Brazil in 1964, its structure evolved lit‑
tle. Private banks remained restricted to commercial lending. The demand for 
credit to finance industrial investment and S&T began to be met only after the 
federal government set up development agencies for this purpose, above all 
BNDES and FINEP in the 1950s and 1960s respectively. Endemic inflation 
kept the financial system and capital market underdeveloped until the 
15 Petrobras (Brazilian Oil Corporation) established CENPE (Research and Development Center) to 
attend its own technological needs with in‑house research work and links with universities and re‑
search institutions all over the country. Telebras’ CPqD (Research and Development Center) reached 
important technological advances in the field of telecommunications in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.
16 It is important to note that agricultural research was well under way in the country before Embrapa’s 
foundation (see next section).
17 The Brazilian patent office, INPI (National Institute of Industrial Property), was founded in 1970. 
18 Following the success of SUDENE (Superintendence for the Development of the Northeast), created 
in 1959 and headed by Celso Furtado, other regional development agencies were created in the 
1970s. 
19 Especially via the National Fund for Scientific & Technological Development (FNDCT).
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mid‑1990s, and this undoubtedly retarded still further the already lagging pro‑
cess of industrialization and, by extension, the process of scientific and techno‑
logical development.
Summing up: (1) higher education institutions had a late development and 
when they did develop their characteristics were framed by historical events of 
Brazilian economy and society, remaining small in scale, concentrated in hu‑
manities, weakly connected with production activities; applied research was 
restricted to agronomy, mining/metallurgy, and health sciences. Engineering 
fields developed even later, and graduate courses linking teaching and research 
activities were introduced only from the 1960s onwards, with Federal govern‑
ment support; (2) specialized research institutes, on the other hand, developed 
relatively earlier to attend local demands mostly from agriculture and public 
health, and played a major role in scientific and technological development in 
those areas (see next section). Framing this picture, local industry demands did 
not stimulate S&T development, and funding remained scarce, as briefly dis‑
cussed below.
IDENTIFyING SUCCESSFUL CASES OF INTERACTION 
To the belatedness and problematical nature of the process of institution 
building for the national innovation system must be added, also with negative 
connotations, the characteristics of the industrialization process, which placed 
limited and relatively unchallenging demands on the nation’s education and 
research institutions.20 Unlike agriculture, whose hegemonic position in the 
economy and society was capable of influencing, to some extent, scientific and 
technological progress, manufacturing industry had little or no influence until 
the end of the 1920s. Being mostly a subsidiary activity to agriculture in terms 
of direct demand, and dependent on agricultural income to fuel domestic de‑
mand, industrialization was restricted throughout this period by the fact that 
demand from the hegemonic sector — and society in general — was limited. 
Only from the 1930s onwards did industrialization become an autonomous 
process focused in the domestic market. Diversification of production ad‑
vanced throughout until the end of the 1970s, but technological needs were 
limited and mostly directed to foreign markets in the form of imports of ma‑
chinery and acquisition of technology. Industry’s demands on S&T institu‑
tions, albeit more sophisticated, remained relatively unchallenging until at 
least the end of the 1980s, as reflected by the late evolution of production 
20 In his reading of the role of large enterprises in the industrialization processes of the U.S. and Ger‑
many, Chandler (1990) refers explicitly to the demands presented and met by education institutions in 
both countries, in contrast with Britain (for the U.S., pp. 82‑83; for Germany, pp. 425‑426).
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structure (see Chart 1). This had to do with excessive protectionism, the dom‑
ination of key industries by foreign capital, lack of continuity in public policy, 
and recurrent macroeconomic crises.21 
Chart 1: 
Evolution of Brazilian Manufacturing Industry  
Production Structure,1920-1990, Percentages
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In this environment the monetary and financial system also remained sub‑
ordinated to agriculture for export, mainly to cater for its needs in terms of 
trade finance. Although industrialization benefited from the development of 
trade bill discounting, the benefits were limited because the financial system 
did not offer long‑term credit for investment. Meanwhile, the government’s 
position was ambivalent: it offered protection for certain industrial activities 
but at the same time cut budget allocations for programs designed to create 
capabilities in technology intensive areas.22
In sum, these characteristics determined a predominant technological pat‑
tern that presented few demands to the scientific and university system. The 
universities remained limited to education. The combination of teaching and 
research began to be systematized only in the 1960s and 1970s, with the orga‑
nization of graduate programs.
21 For an overview of Brazilian industrial development in the 19th century, see Bonelli (1996).
22 Schwartzman (1979, pp. 115‑119) recounts an “attempt to implement chemistry” from 1919 when 
a private member’s bill was passed to set up chemistry institutions and courses in industrial chemistry 
in various parts of the country. The program proceeded successfully until 1930, when the government 
cut off federal funding in response to economic crisis. 
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Despite all these difficulties, linkages between the economy and higher 
education and research institutions did occur in a few knowledge areas. A few 
historical examples focusing specific products are presented in some detail be‑
low to help develop the central argument of this paper. But before that it is 
worth mentioning some science areas in which Brazil accumulated expertise 
after a long process of learning and institution building to match local needs.
Health sciences are one of the world‑class knowledge areas in Brazil to‑
day, especially in biomedical research for production of serums and vaccines. 
Two institutions have made a vital contribution to this achievement and are 
now internationally recognized for the production of both scientific knowl‑
edge, disseminated via the publication of paper in international journals, and 
serums and vaccines. They are the Butantan Institute in São Paulo and the 
Manguinhos Institute in Rio de Janeiro, later renamed the Oswaldo Cruz In‑
stitute and now Fiocruz.
Those two institutions were created between the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century to control the spread of epidemic tropical diseases like yel‑
low fever and Chagas disease, as well as to combat epizootic diseases 
(Schwartzman, 1979, pp. 120‑121). From serum and vaccine production they 
soon progressed to scientific research led by four of the first Brazilian scientists 
to acquire renown: Adolfo Lutz, Vital Brazil, Oswaldo Cruz and Carlos Cha‑
gas. Publication of scientific papers drew attention from foreign scientists, who 
began to take an interest in the research they reported and in working in Bra‑
zil, as was the case in the ensuing decades. An important factor that influenced 
this trend was international recognition for the Manguinhos Institute in 1907, 
when it won a gold medal as first prize at the Fourteenth International Con‑
gress of Hygiene and Demography in Berlin (Schwartzman, 1979, p. 132). The 
same author (p. 129) describes how Manguinhos, set up to produce serums 
and vaccines, was transformed under the leadership of Dr. Oswaldo Cruz into 
a center of education, research, technological development, innovation and 
biomedical service provision, a position consolidated more recently. As for 
Butantan, it has recently been rated the most important research institution in 
Brazil in terms of the mean number of citations per scientific paper pub‑
lished.23
Brazil’s acknowledged international competitiveness in agricultural com‑
modities and agribusiness is grounded not just in comparative advantages but 
also in a long process of research and education institution building in the 
field. The process began at the apogee of the coffee economy between the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century and the first three decades of the twentieth, 
advancing further in step with industrialization from the 1930s on.
23 Study by Rodrigo Semeghini based on data from the Web of Science on citations between 2005 and 
2007 of articles published in 2005 (Folha de S Paulo, Oct. 28, 2007). 
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During the period when coffee was the main export staple, demand from 
coffee growers led to the creation of a number of institutions directly and in‑
directly related to coffee activities starting in the late nineteenth century. These 
institutions played a significant role in the development of education and re‑
search in agrarian sciences during the twentieth century. The most important 
were IAC (1887); the São Paulo Polytechnic (1894), which offered a course in 
agricultural engineering; ESALQ (1901); and the Coffee Defense Service 
(1924), set up to combat coffee pests and diseases and precursor of the Bio‑
logical Institute for Agricultural & Animal Defense (1927), later renamed the 
São Paulo Biological Institute (Schwartzman, 1979, p. 422). 
A nice and well documented example of the activities of those institu‑
tions, in collaboration with the productive sector, may be illustrative. In the 
1920s the São Paulo State Government launched a research program to im‑
prove cotton growing in the region. The aim was to produce cotton with 
longer fibers, which would fetch better prices and enjoy higher demand in the 
international market. The program was executed by a new department dedi‑
cated to cotton, set up in 1922 at IAC, and consisted of the selection of seeds 
and their distribution directly to growers, in accordance with rules laid down 
by IAC’s Cotton Section. A financial institution, the São Paulo Commodity 
Exchange (BMSP), was set up in 1917. Peláez (1972, pp. 114‑120) describes 
the links between IAC, BMSP, the government, the growers and industry. 
BMSP sent technicians abroad for training, and “while IAC was developing 
new cotton fibers, BMSP prepared the market for Brazilian cotton” (p. 117). 
According to Peláez (1972, p. 117), “it included most of the ingredients of 
modern technical assistance programs: development of research centers, tech‑
nology transfer, financial knowledge, specialization abroad, and market de‑
velopment”. 
The role of IAC in researching new varieties of cotton, selecting seeds 
and distributing them to growers had been supported by BMSP since 
1919. Among other things BMSP created a Cotton Grading School in 1922 
(p. 117). The positive results of this program benefited the textile industry, 
then the most important industry in Brazil, and encouraged more textile 
manufacturers to install production facilities in the state (Suzigan, 2000, 
p. 161).
Other cases of successful products in international markets also have his‑
torical roots, albeit less remote, involving interactions between government, 
research institutions and firms. In order to illustrate the main point of this 
paper in a more systematic way, three products which are presently competi‑
tive in international markets have been selected: soybean, steel products, and 
aircraft.
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soybean24
From its experimental introduction in Brazil (1882) until becoming the 
country’s main agricultural export commodity, soybean went through a beau‑
tiful history with experiments to adapt its culture to Brazilian soil and climate, 
formation of plant‑breeders and researchers, and intense interaction between 
science (research institutes, universities), technology (soybean growers, seed 
production firms, agribusinesses) and government (legislation, funding). For 
the sake of brevity, only the major scientific and technological achievements of 
this saga will be presented below.
First and foremost, the formation of Brazilian soybean plant breeders. 
Graduation of agronomic engineers by ESALQ began in early twentieth cen‑
tury, and later on by the Higher School of Agriculture and Veterinary, found‑
ed in the 1920s in Viçosa, state of Minas Gerais, later renamed Federal Uni‑
versity of Viçosa (UFV). From those two institutions came some of the future 
researchers that worked with soybean experiments in the first half of the 
twentieth century, a few of them with a PhD degree from land grant colleges 
in the U.S.A. zancopé & Nasser (2005) describe five lines of varieties in 
which plant breeders were formed, all derived from American varieties, and 
four generations of breeders, starting with a master generation formed mostly 
by American researchers working in Brazil, followed by three generations of 
Brazilian breeders, with two breeders in the first, 16 in the second, and three 
in the third generation. The authors state that the adaptation of American 
varieties to the temperate climate of Rio Grande do Sul occurred between 
1920 and 1940, so that soybean started to appear in that state’s statistics in 
1941. The experiments were conducted at agronomical research institutes 
(IAC and IAS — Agronomical Institute of the South, in Rio Grande do Sul), 
and later also at UFV.
In the 1950s the first generation of Brazilian plant breeders, working at 
IAC with the assistance of an American breeder, came out with new varieties 
(1958) considered to be the first commercially successful Brazilian varieties. 
This achievement showed that Brazilian agronomical researchers working 
with soybean had acquired scientific knowledge and technological capability 
to develop entirely new varieties. In fact, the following 1960 and 1970 decades 
witnessed the adaptation of new cultivars to the dry conditions of the Brazil‑
ian central region (Cerrado) by UFV and the newly created Embrapa (Brazil‑
ian Agricultural Research Corporation, 1973).
Other major scientific and technological achievements were: the develop‑
ment of varieties adapted to longer lengths of lightness; inoculation of bacteria 
24 This section draws extensively from a book (zancopé & Nasser, 2005) which analyses “the saga of 
Brazilian soybean” from its introduction in the country to present days. We are thankful to Evando 
Mirra de Paula e Silva for bringing this book to our attention.
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that feed nitrogen to the plant; mechanization of the farms; planting by di‑
rect‑drilling; development of a seed industry, and control of soybean plagues. 
The following paragraphs give a succinct explanation of each one of those 
technological developments.
Adaptation of soybean to longer periods of light (photoperiod) started 
with the identification, by one of the first generation Brazilian plant breeders 
in 1958, of a variety that was insensitive to the photoperiod. A little later a 
second generation plant breeder developed a variety with a naturally long cy‑
cle, better adapted to the differences of lightness in the North and South hemi‑
spheres. The greatest achievement, however, was the discovery by a Brazilian 
breeder working in the U.S.A. of the recessive gene that controls the plant’s 
sensitivity to the photoperiod. After completing his PhD, that Brazilian breed‑
er returned to Brazil and opened in the Embrapa branch dedicated to soybean 
in the state of Paraná a pioneer line of genetic research which meant Brazilian 
technological autonomy in genetic research of the photoperiod. With this 
achievement, Brazilian breeders became capable of producing cultivars adapt‑
ed even to latitude zero, turning soybean a tropical plant.
Technological efforts to develop bacteria25 inoculants to reduce the need 
of fertilizers started in the 1930s at the IAC, but only in the 1950s did the 
Microbiology Section of the Rio Grande do Sul Secretary of Agriculture began 
to develop rhizobium colonies for large scale production. At about the same 
time, the Institute of Biology and Technological Research (presently known as 
Tecpar — Technology Institute of Paraná) in the state of Paraná, developed its 
own cultures of rhizobium and started to produce inoculants. Large scale com‑
mercial production of inoculants was undertaken by private firms in Rio 
Grande do Sul and Paraná states.
Mechanization of Brazilian soybean cultures was late because of the late 
development of domestic agricultural machinery production. A few national 
firms started to produce wheeled tractors and harvesters in the 1960s in Rio 
Grande do Sul, but soon some large international manufacturers built plants 
in Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná. However, only after the creation of a special 
credit line at BNDES in 1976 did mechanization advance. At present, produc‑
tion is fully mechanized in Brazilian soybean farms.
Direct‑drilling — to plant directly on the vegetable coverage of the soil — 
was introduced in the late 1960s in the states of São Paulo, Paraná and Rio 
Grande do Sul. However, it was in the Cerrado26 that direct‑drilling proved to be 
a valuable technique. It turned the low fertility lands of Cerrado into economi‑
cally viable lands (zancopé & Nasser, 2005, p. 194). When Cerrado lands be‑
came viable, Brazilian soybean production soared from the late 1970s onwards.
25 The scientific name of the bacterium is Bradyrhizobium japonicum. It draws nitrogen from the air 
and feeds it to the plant, thus reducing the need of fertilizers.
26 Brazilian savannah, in the central region of the country.
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The first Brazilian firm in the seed industry (Agroceres) was established in 
1945. It was subsequently sold to foreign capital, renationalized in the 1980s, 
and finally denationalized again in 1997. Today the industry is dominated by 
foreign firms. More important, however, was the formation, from the late 
1950s onwards, of agronomical engineers specialized in seed inspection, and 
the enactment in 1965 of a Brazilian seed law regulating production and com‑
mercialization. 
When soybean culture spread quickly in the 1980s, its cultivation started 
to be stressed by plagues. The soybean division of Embrapa came to play a 
most important role in biological control. An example is the biological solu‑
tion for the plague of the soybean‑worm. In fact, solution of this case started 
before the foundation of Embrapa. In 1972, an agronomy student at ESALQ 
observed that soybean‑worms were dying in an atypical way in experimental 
fields. The insects were sent to an insect pathologist in the U.S. who discovered 
that the worms had been infected by a lethal virus. After completing his gradu‑
ate studies with the same pathologist in the U.S. the student returned and, al‑
ready working at the soybean division of Embrapa, developed a biological in‑
secticide. Field tests in the beginning of the 1980s proved the efficiency of the 
insecticide, which was finally formulated and licensed to five commercial firms 
in 1986 (zancopé & Nasser, 2005, p. 202‑3). 
This case shows clearly that all agents — higher education institutions, 
research institutes, government, agricultural producers and business firms — 
interacted for a long period before soybean became a major export commod‑
ity. Chart 2 gives a summary picture of the soybean saga in Brazil.
Chart 2: Brazilian Soybean Cultivated Area, 1952-2006 (thousand hectares)  
and Exports, 1989-2008 (US$ million, FOB)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1920 1940 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Textiles, clothing, food, furniture, and other consumer goods industries
Metallurgical, chemical, paper, and other intermediate goods industries
Mechanical, electrical and e ectronics machinery, tran port equipment
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
19
52
19
54
19
56
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
Cultivated area Exports
Adaptation to tropical climate; Mechanization; 
Genetic control of photoperiod; Inoculants; 
Direct-drilling; Seed industry.
1997: Law of  Cultivars
1958: First Brazilian Varieties
1000 Hectrares
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
US$ bilhões
FOB
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
US$
FOB
19
74
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data available at IpeaData (www.ipea.gov.br)
Revista de Economia Política  31 (1), 201124
steel products
The first business ventures in iron production in Brazil date from the early 
nineteenth century, but it was not until the Ouro Preto School of Mines 
(EMOP) was founded that production began to increase in scale. The creation 
of EMOP was inspired by Emperor Pedro II’s 1872 visit to the Nancy School 
of Mines, which he used as a model, and by his contact with Auguste Dubrée, 
director of the Paris School of Mines, whom he invited to head the future 
school in Brazil. Unveiled in 1876, EMOP exerted growing influence by train‑
ing geologists, mining engineers and metallurgical engineers. Between the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, these professionals contributed to the 
creation of geographical and geological institutions and the mapping of iron 
ore reserves in Brazil. Their studies and research located and measured large 
reserves of high‑content iron ore, and in 1910 their discoveries were presented 
at an international conference in Stockholm, attracting foreign companies to 
develop the reserves (Schwartzman, 1979, p. Appendix; Suzigan, 2000, pp. 
274‑75). Several projects bore fruit, giving rise to the first steel mills in Brazil 
in the 1920s. But the decisive boost was creation of CSN (National Steel Cor‑
poration) and Vale (Vale do Rio Doce Corporation) during World War II, fol‑
lowed by public policy to accelerate industrialization in the post‑war years.
However, one of the most important factors that explain the current suc‑
cess of Brazil’s mining and steel industries is the rich experience of interaction 
between firms and the Department of Metallurgical & Materials Engineering 
at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG).27 After creation of a grad‑
uate course in metallurgical and materials engineering by UFMG in 1973, its 
researchers discovered the industry’s difficulties with imported technology and 
took the initiative of proposing collaboration with firms to diagnose the prob‑
lems and offer solutions. The collaboration, funded by FINEP, started with the 
creation of technological extension courses and was later extended to include 
graduate programs run jointly by firms and the university. Between 1975 and 
2006 the department awarded 256 master’s degrees in metallurgical engineer‑
ing to employees of 36 firms, and 20 PhD degrees to employees of ten firms, 
all in mining and steel production. Several of the master’s dissertations and 
doctoral theses contributed important knowledge motivated by the search for 
solutions to concrete problems faced by firms, generating patents and techno‑
logical innovations in processes and products. Among the technological prob‑
lems solved are: development of steel plates that harden in the process of bak‑
ing (bake‑hardenability), then dominated by Japanese steel firms; thermal 
treatment of steel plates in the continuous rolling mill; development of materi‑
als with a greater resistance to use by substituting niobium for molybdenum; 
27 For a detailed and elegant description of this experience by one of its protagonists, Evando Mirra de 
Paula e Silva, see Paula e Silva (2007).
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development of electrical and magnetic steels; development of stainless steel 
leagues for ethanol‑fueled engines; development of metals which are sensitive 
to light, and development of colored stainless steels. 28
Among the firms that interacted are those which are today the most com‑
petitive in international markets: Vale (mining), Acesita (special steel), CSN, 
Usiminas, Cosipa and Açominas (steel). Production and exports soared from 
the late 1970s and Brazil is today one of the largest producers and exporters 
of ore and steel in the world (see Chart 3).
Chart 3: Brazilian Steel Industry Exports, 1974-2007 (US$ billion, current prices)
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In addition to concrete results for the firms, this program of universi‑
ty‑firms collaboration clearly demonstrates the importance of linking graduate 
courses to research; proves that teaching activities can also benefit from col‑
laboration with firms; and offers evidence that interactions can be prolonged 
indefinitely by the formation of interactive networks of researchers in firms 
and universities.
aircraft
The position enjoyed today by Embraer (Brazilian Aeronautics Corpora‑
tion) as one of the world’s leading aircraft manufacturers results from a long 
history of efforts involving government, firms, and research and education in‑
stitutions. Since the 1930s the armed services and civilian experts alike had 
tried to persuade the government that Brazil needed an aeronautical industry 
28 Paula e Silva (2007) presents several concrete cases that illustrate the brilliant results achieved in 
technically elegant detail. 
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as part of the industrialization process and national defense strategy (Forjaz, 
2005, pp. 281‑282).
The first step, taken in the 1940s in the context of World War II, was cre‑
ation of the Air Force Ministry to merge military aviation subordinated to the 
army and naval aviation into a single force. The project was designed from the 
start to assure mastery of aeronautical technology. As a result, well before 
aircraft production, an aeronautical engineering course was created at ITA 
and CTA was set up as a research center. Both were planned in late 1945. ITA 
began operating in 1948 on the premises of the Institute of Military Engineer‑
ing (Rio de Janeiro) and was formally created in early 1950, when it was in‑
stalled at São José dos Campos. CTA was set up shortly afterwards, with ITA 
formally subordinated to it (Forjaz, 2005, p. 290).
Thus the training of aeronautical engineers and mastery of aeronautical 
technology preceded creation of the industry. To assure a standard of excel‑
lence in these activities, agreements were signed with foreign institutions that 
sent scientists, researchers and professors while accepting Brazilian graduate 
students to study abroad. In 1961 ITA began its own graduate course, and a 
prototype of the Bandeirante aircraft designed and built at CTA flew in 1968. 
Embraer was founded as a state company in 1969 and privatized in 1994.
Chart 4: Brazilian Exports of Aircraft, 1996-1998 (US$ billion, current prices)
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This was a pioneering experience in linkages between education, research 
and industry, with flows of personnel, researchers and students between Brazil 
and abroad contributing decisively to the industry’s successful implementa‑
tion. This long standing collaboration led the company to occupy a niche in 
the international aircraft manufacturing industry, becoming one of Brazil’s 
largest export firms (see Chart 4).
Analyzing this case, Forjaz (2005, p. 292) stresses that “native S&T de‑
velopment requires a relatively long maturation period and thus requires per‑
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sistence and confidence in the future. However, it enables a domestic industry 
to offer the products that markets want and that are capable of surviving in a 
fiercely competitive international market”.
Other cases could also be discussed, but the examples given will suffice to 
provide an overview of the demands presented by the economy and society 
during some of the “institution‑building waves” we have identified. More cas‑
es are described in Furtado (1982) who, in discussing the tensions created by 
the industrialization process under Vargas in the 1930s, mentions the contri‑
bution by IPT (Technological Research Institute) to development of the cement 
industry (p. 21) and metallurgical industry (p. 23). Even the creation of USP 
can be seen as linked to the industrialization drive beginning in the 1920s, 
based on certain highly utilitarian positions advocated in debates on the future 
university (Schwartzman, 1979, p. 192).
In other words, the examples of successful cases do indeed indicate the 
importance of long‑term construction involving systematic efforts that persist 
over time. They contribute to an explanation of the historical roots of the sci‑
entific specializations that Brazil has today: medicine/health sciences, agricul‑
ture, materials/metallurgy engineering, and aeronautics are major knowledge 
areas and/or scientific disciplines in Brazil. This brief overview contributes to 
an understanding of the long construction process that has taken place in these 
areas.
CONCLUSION
This paper has shown four inter‑related topics that enlighten the nature of 
a key component of Brazilian NSI: the interactions between universities, pub‑
lic research institutions and firms. First, there is an important role of public 
research institutes and universities in successful cases of Brazilian economy. 
Conventional wisdom usually underestimates this important role. Second, his‑
tory of science and technology institutions shows a long‑term process of for‑
mation of these public research institutes and/or higher education institutions 
and their interactions with industrial firms, agricultural product growers or 
society. This long‑term formation process may have important implications 
for present day public policies. Third, this long‑term formation process has led 
to points of science‑technology interaction that may be identified today by 
conventional tools of the economics of innovation. In other words, in the Bra‑
zilian case, contemporary successful cases of interaction have long‑term his‑
torical roots. Fourth, as the economic history of science and technology sug‑
gests, the inclusion of the monetary‑financial dimension in this analysis is 
worthwhile, since it has been possible to show previous or simultaneous 
changes in funding and financing conditions related to these long‑term pro‑
cesses.
These topics put forward an important research issue: why are successful 
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cases of interaction between universities, public research institutions and firms 
so limited in the Brazilian case? One topic in answering this question is the late 
onset of Brazilian institutions that constitute a system of innovation. Further‑
more, the 19th century institutional context that embedded this institutional 
late onset is a handicap: the presence of slavery, the colonial nature of the 
country, just to indicate some important topics. This institutional context left 
its marks in the later process: the result is a long term path‑dependent process, 
a process that incorporates and reproduces over time the income inequality of 
that period. Celso Furtado (1987) calls it the polarization “moderniza‑
tion‑marginalization”. This polarization, as it reproduces itself over time, 
blocks a broader spread of these positive feedbacks between research institu‑
tions and economic agents.
Finally, there is an important challenge. One of the main features of capi‑
talist development has been the increasing scientific content of technologies. 
For countries like Brazil, that has a catching up process as a goal, the interac‑
tions between universities and firms are even more important from now on. 
There is a lot of institutional building that has to be done now — a truly sixth 
wave of institutional formation. But, as this paper has shown, time matters to 
the formation of the necessary institutions and for the maturing of their inter‑
actions with firms and society. Therefore, public policies must be institution‑
ally creative to handle these challenges.
Besides unblocking the lock‑in represented by the polarization “modern‑
ization‑marginalization”, there is a two‑sided process to be triggered. On the 
one hand, there is no time to waste, so it is now that must be defined bold in‑
vestments combining the development of the scientific side with the industrial 
dimension. On the other hand, this process should be telescoped — there are 
lessons to be learned from the South Korean and Taiwanese catching up pro‑
cesses, which telescoped the maturation of important institutions of their in‑
novation system.
REFERENCES
ARRIGHI, G. (1994) O Longo Século XX: Dinheiro, Poder e as Origens do Nosso Tempo. Rio de 
Janeiro/São Paulo: Contraponto/Unesp.
BONELLI, R. (1996) Ensaios sobre Política Econômica e Industrialização no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: 
SENAI.
BOSI, A. (1993) Dialética da Colonização. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.
BRAUDEL, F. (1979) Civilização material, economia e capitalismo — séculos XV-XVIII.: Volume 2 
— Os jogos das trocas. São Paulo: Martins Fontes (1996). 
BRAUDEL, F. (1986) Civilização material, economia e capitalismo – séculos XV-XVIII.: Volume 3 – O 
tempo do mundo. São Paulo: Martins Fontes (1996). 
CARVALHO, J. M. (2002) A Escola de Minas de Ouro Preto: O Peso da Glória. Belo Horizonte: 
Editora da UFMG, 2ª. edição.
CHANDLER JR., A. (1990) Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Harvard: Belk‑
nap.
Revista de Economia Política  31 (1), 2011 29
COHEN, W., NELSON, R.; WALSH, J. (2002) “Links and impacts: the influence of public R&D on 
industrial research”, Management Science, 48 (1): 1‑23.
COHEN, W.; LEVINTHAL, D. (1989) “Innovation and learning: the two faces of R&D”, The Econo-
mic Journal, 99 (397): 569‑596.
CUNHA, L. A. (1980) A Universidade Temporã. Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves.
FORJAz, M. C. S. (2005) “As origens da Embraer”, Tempo Social, Revista de Sociologia da USP, v. 
17: 281‑298.
FREEMAN, C. (1995) “The “National System of Innovation” in historical perspective”, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, v. 19 (1).
FREEMAN, C. (1999) “Innovation systems: city‑state, national, continental and sub‑regional”, in 
CASSIOLATO, J.; LASTRES, H. Globalização e Inovação Localizada. Brasília: IBICT: 
109‑167. 
FREyRE, G. (1990) Sobrados e Mucambos. Rio de Janeiro: Record (12ª. edição, 2000).
FURTADO, C. (1982) Análise do “Modelo” Brasileiro. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira (8ª. Edi‑
ção, 1986).
FURTADO, C. (1987) “Underdevelopment: to conform or to reform” in MEIER, G. (ed) Pioneers of 
Development. Second Series. Oxford: Oxford University/World Bank. 
HOLANDA, S. B. (1991) Raízes do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio (23ª edição).
KLEVORICK, A.; LEVIN, R.; NELSON, R.; WINTER, S. (1995) “On the sources and significance of 
inter‑industry differences in technological opportunities”, Research Policy, v. 24: 185‑205.
MADDISON, A. (2001) The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: OECD.
MOKyR, J. (1990) The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
MOTOyAMA, S., org. (2004) Prelúdio para uma História: Ciência e Tecnologia no Brasil. São Paulo: 
Edusp/Fapesp.
NARIN, F.; HAMILTON, K. S.; OLIVASTRO, D. (1997) “The increasing linkage between U.S. tech‑
nology and public science”, Research Policy, 26 (3): 317‑330.
NELSON, R., ed. (1993) National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis. New york, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
NELSON, R.; ROSENBERG, N. (1993) “Technical innovation and national systems”, in Nelson 
(1993: 3‑21). 
NELSON, R.; ROSENBERG, N. (1994) “American universities and technical advance” Research Po-
licy, v. 23: 323‑348.
NELSON, R.; WRIGHT, G. (1992) “The rise and fall of American technological leadership: the pos‑
twar era in historical perspective”, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 30, December.
NOVAIS, F. (1979) Portugal e Brasil na Crise do Antigo Sistema Colonial (1777‑1808). São Paulo: 
HUCITEC.
O’SULLIVAN, M. (2004) “Finance and innovation”, in FAGERBERG, J.; MOWERy, D.; NELSON, 
R. Oxford Handbook on Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
OECD (2002) Benchmarking industry-science relationships. Paris: OECD.
PAULA, J. A. (1988) Prometeu no Sertão: Economia e Sociedade na Capitania das Minas dos Matos 
Gerais. São Paulo: USP/Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras (Tese de Doutorado em Histó‑
ria). 
PAULA E SILVA, E. M. (2007) “A experiência da colaboração do departamento de engenharia meta‑
lúrgica e de materiais da UFMG com empresas: Lições para a Lei da Inovação”, Revista Brasilei-
ra de Inovação, 6 (2): 433‑459.
PELÁEz, C. (1972) História da Industrialização Brasileira: Crítica à Teoria Estruturalista no Brasil. 
Rio de Janeiro: APEC.
PELÁEz, C. M.; SUzIGAN, W. (1976) História Monetária do Brasil: Análise da Política, Comporta-
mento e Instituições Monetárias. Rio de Janeiro: IPEA.
RAVETz, J. R. (1990) “The Copernican revolution”, in OLBy, R. C. Companion to the history of 
modern science. London: Routledge, pp. 201‑216.
Revista de Economia Política  31 (1), 201130
REALE, G.; ANTISERI, D. (1986) História da Filosofia. São Paulo: Paulus (1990), volume II: 
185‑322.
ROSENBERG, N. 1972. Technology and American economic growth. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. 
ROSENBERG, N. (1982) Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
ROSENBERG, N. (1991) “Why do firms do basic research (with their money)?” Research Policy, v.19: 
165‑174.
ROSENBERG, N. (2000) Schumpeter and the Endogeneity of Technology: Some American Perspecti-
ves. London: Routledge.
SANJAD, N. (2006) “Emílio Goeldi (1859‑1917) e a institucionalização das ciências naturais na Ama‑
zônia”, Revista Brasileira de Inovação, 5 (2): 455‑477.
SCHUMPETER, J. (1939) Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the 
Capitalist Process  Philadelphia: Porcupine, 1989 edition.
SCHWARTzMAN, S. (1979) Formação da Comunidade Científica no Brasil. São Paulo: Nacional.
SCHWARz, R. (1991) Um Mestre na Periferia do Capitalismo: Machado de Assis. São Paulo: Duas 
Cidades, 2a edição.
STEPAN, N. (1976) Beginnings of Brazilian Science: Osvaldo Cruz, Medical Research and Policy, 
1890-1920. New york: Science History Publications.
SUzIGAN, W. (2000) Indústria Brasileira: Origem e Desenvolvimento. São Paulo: Hucitec.
SyLLA, R. (1982) “Monetary innovation in América”, Journal of Economic History, v. XLII (1): 
21‑30.
SzMRECSÁNyI, T. (2000) “Por uma história econômica da ciência e da tecnologia”, Economia Apli-
cada, v. 4 (2): 399‑407.
zANCOPÉ, G. J.; NASSER, J. M. (2005) O Brasil que Deu Certo: A Saga da Soja Brasileira. Curitiba: 
Tríade.
